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TAX CONSIDERATIONS IN MAKING GIFTS TO
SONS-IN-LAWS
I. THE

STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

The Wisconsin Inheritance Tax Statutes tax at the most favorable
rate of two per cent any transfer of property after death up to twentyfive thousand dollars.
* * * where the person or persons entitled to any beneficial
interest in such property shall be the husband, wife, lineal issue,
lineal ancestor, brother or sister, or descendant of brother or
or sister of the decedent, a wife or widow of a son, or husband
of a daughter of the decedent ....

Later sections tax the property at six per cent if given to uncles and
aunts and their descendants and at eight per cent where the gift is to a
person more distantly related or to a stranger to the blood.' The progressive gradations in rates applicable to amounts over twenty-five
thousand dollars are multiples of the primary rates referred to here.'
After the tax has been computed, it must be augmented by thirty per
4
cent emergency tax.

Exemptions are provided to the extent of fifteen thousand dollars
to the widow, five thousand dollars to the husband of the decedent, five
hundred dollars to a brother or sister or the descendant of a brother or
sister of the decedent, and two thousand dollars to each of the other
persons mentioned in the above quoted statute. Any other person receives a mere hundred dollar exemption.'
Included among the taxable death transfers are those made under
a power of appointment, but excepted from the definition of "Power
of appointment" is a power in which the class of possible appointees:
•.. excludes the donee of the power and is restricted to the
husband, wife, lineal issue, the wife or widow of a son and the
husband of a daughter of the creator of the power ....

I

The second lowest gift tax rate (four per cent) applies to gifts
made to, among others, "the wife or widow of a son or the husband of
a daughter" of the donor.7 These persons are nowhere mentioned in
the lifetime exemptions 8 or in the exclusion 9from the definition of a
power of appointment in the gift tax statutes.
STAT. §72.02 (1) (1957) (Italics added). See also Neb. R. R. S. §77-2004,
Mo. REV. STAT. §573 (2). In Illinois (SMITH-HURD STAT. §375), NEW JERSEY
(STAT. §54:34-2) and New York, N.Y. Consol. Laws (§249-q) the language
is substantially the same except "husband or widower of a daughter" is used.
(Italics added).
2 WIS. STAT. §72.02 (3) & (4) (1957).
3 WIS. STAT. §72.03 & 72.035 (1957).
4 WIS. STAT. §72.74 (1957).
5 Wis. STAT. §72.04 (1957).
1Wis.

6 WiS. STAT. §72.01 (5) (1957).
7WAiT. STAT. §72.77 (2) (1957).
8 WiS. STAT. §72.80 (1957).
9

WIS. STAT. §72.75 (3) (1957).
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II. PROBLEMS POSED BY THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE

The questions most commonly raised by the language quoted above
are:
1. Does a son-in-law remain the "husband of a daughter" after the
daughter's death ?
2. If he does, does he remain such (or does the daughter-in-law
remain the "wife or widow of a son") after remarriage?
It appears that these questions have not been answered by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. They have, however, been given various and often
conflicting answers by the courts of many states having similar tax
statutes. The answer to the questions will have an effect on draftsmanship of wills and powers and on tax planning generally.
Suppose a direct gift in a will to a named person who is, at the
time of the execution of the will, the son-in-law of the testator. If at
the time of the testator's death the legatee's wife is deceased, will the
gift be taxed at the primary rate of two per cent or at six per cent?
Assuming the lower rate to be applicable, would the same be true if
the legatee has remarried? If the transfer is taxed at the lower rate,
presumably the two thousand dollar exemption is available; otherwise
the exemption is limited to one hundred dollars.'0
Again suppose a Wisconsin testator wishes to draft a testamentary
power of appointment, as broad as possible in its delineation of the
class of possible appointees, and yet narrow enough to escape taxation
to the appointee after the donee has exercised the power (or to the
takers in default if the power has not been exercised). Will it be
necessary for the testator to use the exact terms of the statute in describing the class? Assuming he has found it prudent to do so, will the
donee be safe in appointing to the surviving spouse (remarried or not)
of a deceased child of the testator or might it be argued that such exercise of the power exceeded its terms and is thus invalid? Assuming
the exercise to be valid as a matter of property law, is the transfer
nonetheless taxable to the appointee?" Again assume the power has
not been exercised; can the Department of Taxation successfully contend that the transfer is taxable to the taker in default on the grounds
that the power might have been exercised in favor of a surviving
spouse (remarried or not) and hence is not a tax-exempt power?
As will be seen, these questions have been raised in one form or
other in all too many cases in various jurisdictions to be regarded as
purely academic. They have a significant practical impact on many
10 Wis. STAT.
11

§72.045 (3) (1957). It seems that in the case of an inter vivos gift,
only the rate problem would be met.
In the gift tax, a power including a son-in-law would always be taxable, but
the applicable rate would be at issue.
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phases of draftsmanship and estate planning and cannot be safely
ignored by the careful practitioner.
III.

THE EFFECT OF THE DAUGHTER'S PRE-DECEASING THE TESTATOR
OR DONEE OF A SPECIAL POWER

Although it appears that many of the older dictionaries defined husband as a man with a living wife," a surviving husband being more
properly referred to as a "widower", the latter term seems to enjoy a
marked unpopularity with the legislatures. While "widow" is commonly used, "husband" seems frequently to be the male counterpart
1 3
when it is obvious from the context that surviving husband is meant.
The tax statutes in question were in many respects taken from New
York, and it is in that jurisdiction that the issue was first decided. In
In re Woolsey's Estate (Matter of McGarvey)14 a legatee objected to
the account filed by an executor. The executor, in paying a legacy to
the widower of the testatrix daughter, had not paid any tax, presumably on the theory that the legatee was the "husband of a daughter."
It appears that the proceeding was wholly ex parte: the executor did
not contest, nor did the tax authorities appear. The Surrogate Court
allowed the account, saying in a half-page opinion:
The legislature may have had in view more than the benefits
accruing to the wife of the legatee by this exemption. The children of a deceased daughter may have been favored by the exemption, from this tax, of a legacy to their father.
Another New York Surrogate Court reached the same conclusion
in In re Ray's Estate.'5 There the legatee had, after his wife's death,
lived with and cared for the testatrix mother-in-law until her death.
The court observed that the laws of descent often use "husband" in the
sense of "widower", and could see no reason why a widow and not a
widower should be exempt.
This viewpoint is, of course, implicitly accepted by those authorities,
hereinafter cited, which hold that remarriage does not destroy the
exemptions provided for by the statute. However, cases dealing solely
with the issue of survival by affinitive relatives are not numerous.
Illinois 16 has decided to follow New York and cited the further ground
that the tax is a "special" tax and is to be construed against the state.
The legislature of that state has since ratified the decision by amending the statute to read "husband or widower". A six to two decision
12See, e.g., statements in In re Ray's Estate, infra.
13 See, e.g., Wis. STAT. §233.01 (1957). "The widow of every deceased person
... shall be entitled to dower .. " and §233.23. "The husband of every wife
dying ...

shall be entitled to courtesy ... "

14 6 Dem. Sur. 145, 19 Abb.
15 35 N.Y.S. 481 (1895).
16

N. C. 232, 20 N.Y.S.R. 135 (1887).

People v. Snyder, 353 Ill. 184, 187 N.E. 158, 88 A.L.R. 1012 (1933).
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of the Supreme Court of Michigan'r is in accord, the court following
New York and further observing that the words "husband, wife" are
used just a few words earlier where the husband or wife of the decedent is meant, the legislature implicitly recognizing in the same statute
that death of a spouse does not destroy the appropriateness of the
designation. The dissenting judges favor a rule of strict construction
of exemption statutes, citing as authority the earlier Michigan case of
In re Gay's Estate,' hereafter discussed. A Minnesota Attorney General's Opinion' 9 follows New York and "overwhelming authority" on
the point. In Connecticut, where the language used is "wife of a son",
it has been held that a widowed daughter-in-law will qualify.2" The
court notes that the word "wife" is used earlier where the wife of the
transferor is spoken of, and further reasons that ambiguities are to be
resolved in favor of the taxpayer. That a widow is the "wife of a son,"
Texas seems to agree. 2 '
Many of the cases holding that remarriage disqualifies a legatee
contain statements to the effect that the mere death of the spouse would
produce the same result, but in these cases, this view may be regarded
as dictum. The only case found holding that a surviving husband is
not a "husband of a daughter" is Tax Commission of Ohio v. Hirsch-2
In that case the testator had left property in trust for his daughter for
life, remainder to her husband if he survived her, otherwise remainder
to their children. The court found the higher rate of tax to be applicable to the husband's contingent remainder, on the ground that he would
not be the "husband of a daughter" when the interest vested. The
court observed that in many Ohio statutes widows are favored over
widowers and that wherever "husband" is used in the sense of widower, it is "husband-relict", or else it was clear from the context that
surviving husband was meant. The court was not impressed by the
New York authority, holding that this meant merely that the Ohio
legislature was aware of the necessity of judicial construction.
IV.

TIE

EFFECT OF REMARRIAGE

Two-thirds of the opinion in In re Ray's Estate23 was written before
it was brought to the court's attention that the legatee had remarried.
The court felt that dictionary definitions were irrelevant, the question
being one of how terms are used in the particular statute. As the legisIn re Atherton's Estate, 333 Mich. 193, 52 N.W. 2d 660 (1952).
Is310 Mich. 226, 17 N.W. 2d 163 (1945).
'9 CCH Inh. Tax Rep., §18,471, released Jan. 4, 1956.
-, 158 A. 2d 174 (1960).
20 Sullivan v. Union & New Haven Trust Co., -Conn.
21 Lewis v. O'Hair, 130 S.W. 2d 379 (Tex. Civ. App., '1939). The most recent
case regarding a widower as a husband of a daughter seems to be Dennis v.
Commissioner, -Mass. -, 165 N.E. 2d 893 (1960).
22 31 Ohio App. 325, 167 N.E. 400 (1929) agreeing with Ohio Attorney General
Opinion 3113, O.A. Vol. 1, 1922, p. 398.
'7

23 Supra, note 15.
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lature had not explicitly made remarriage a bar, the court could not do
so, and the exemption was allowed.
The rule of this case has enjoyed an authority quite unusual for a
lower court decision. Eighteen years after the Ray decision, the New
Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals felt compelled to follow it.2 4 The

court dismissed the argument that the rule had not been passed on by
a court of last resort in New York or elsewhere, taking notice that
"the fact that surrogates deal largely and exclusively with matter
relating to deceased persons qualifies them with expert knowledge of
the subject." The court was further impressed by an argument from
silence: the tax authorities had taken no appeal in the Ray case and the
New York legislature, in passing a new tax law in 1909, had made no
change in the language. It was held that "widow" (a female legatee
being involved in the New Jersey case) was descriptive of the person,
and not of the state or condition. The same rule has been applied in
Michigan 25 and in a probate court in Ohio.26
Long before the Ray case, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had
construed "wife or widow of a son" in a similar statute in that state
and reached the opposite conclusion.
The court said the defendant
was not the "wife" of the son since the son was dead, and not the
"widow" since that term is, in law and convention, exclusively descriptive of the unmarried condition of a woman who has once been married.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine has since concluded that a remarried man is not the "husband or widower of a daughter." The
court held that the condition, not the person, was described by the
statute.28 The Attorney General of Texas has expressed the view that
a remarried but subsequently divorced man is not a "husband of a
daughter." Although the death of his wife does not affect the appropriateness of the description, remarriage does, and subsequent divorce will
not restore the status.2 9 A recent case in that state has so held in the
same situation."0
In Nebraska, an Attorney General's Opinion had held that the New
York opinion was controlling and that a remarried woman is the widow
of a son.31 This opinion seems to have been overruled in that state by
the recent case of In re Thompson's Estate.32 There the legatee son-inlaw had remarried during the testatrix' lifetime, had paid the taxes at
the highest rate, and sued the county for a refund. The Supreme Court
24 Clay v. Edwards, 84 N.J.L. 143, 86 AtI. 548 (1913).
25 In re Rhead's Estate, 288 Mich. 220, 284 N.W. 2d 707 (1939).
26 In re Waters' Estate, 101 N.E. 2d 815 (Ohio Probate Court, 1951). The court
distinguished on the facts the authorities cited in note 13.
2 Commonwealth v. Powell, 51 Pa. 438 (1866).
2s Canal National Bank of Portland v. Bailey, 142 Me. 314, 51 A. 2d 482 (1947).
29 CCH Inh. Tax Rep, §18,601, released Jan. 29, 1957.
30 Cahn v. Calvert, 321 S.W. 2d 869 (Tex. Civ. App., 1959).
31
CCH Inh. Tax Rep., §18,614 released Apr. 19, 1957.
32
-Neb. -, 99 N.W. 2d 245 (1959).
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held for the county, relying strongly on the rule of strict construction
of exemption statutes against the taxpayer. It felt that the Nebraska
law was passed so soon after the Ray decision that it was not fair to
charge the Nebraska legislature with knowledge of that lower court
case. The court further doubted that a New York rule was highly
authorative on the point, since, in its opinion the New York draftsman
had borrowed heavily from the earlier Pennsylvania Act construed in
Commonwealth v. Powell.3
V.

ANALOGIES FROM OTHER FIELDS OF LAW

When tax statutes have not been in question, the courts seem to
have favored a broad interpretation of terms denoting relationship.
Especially has this been true in the case of the word "widow." In
Davis v. Neal34 the Arkansas court held that homestead statutes are to
be liberally construed so that a remarried woman is a "widow" entitled
to homestead, the term being mere descriptio personae. Oregon has
held that remarriage and removal to the husband's home will not cut
off the homestead right, the legislature not having explicitly indicated
35
the contrary.
8
Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. v. Garr"
is authority for the
proposition that, even though the statute refers to "widow", a woman's
remarriage will not cut off her right to sue her husband's employer
for wrongful death, nor will it diminish damages.
New Jersey has held that, until the legislature amended the statute
to provide otherwise, a widow's remarriage had no effect on her right
to payments under the Workman's Compensation Law.3 7 Nor, accorddower.-" California, in construing "widow or widower" as used in her
community property law, regarded the Ray case as in point, and held
that remarriage had no effect on the ultimate devolution of the property.

39

In the early Pennsylvania case Appeal of Kearns 9 a widow's right
to elect against the decedent's will was challenged on the ground of
laches and remarriage. The court decided against the widow on the
first ground, but stated that the second would also be a good point.
The Louisiana court in Franek v. Brewster4' denied a remarried
widow the right to a payment from an estate where the statute provided for such payment to a "widow in necessitous circumstances."
It is far from clear whether the decision went on the ground of non33 Supra, note 27.
34

100 Ark. 399, 140 S.W. 278 (1911).

In re Altz's Estate, 104 Ore. 59, 212 Pac. 409 (1921).
3657 Ga. 277 (1876).
35

37 Hansen v. Brann and Stewart Co., 90 N.J.L. 444, 103 Atl. 696 (1917).
38 Matthews v. Marsden, 71 Mont. 502, 230 Pac. 775 (1924).
"9Re Estate of McArthur, 210 Cal. 327, 292 Pac. 469, 72 A.L.R. 1318 (1930).
40 120 Pa. 523, 14 Ati. 435 (1888).
41141 La. 1031, 76 So. 187 (1916).
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widowhood or of non-necessitous circumstances; there are statements
to indicate both.
The Michigan court, despite its liberal view of the tax statute in
other cases, 42 favored a strict interpretation of another phrase of the
same statute in In re Gay's Estate.43 The statute provides for the same
treatment as is accorded to the husbands and widows in our problem
,to anyone who: ". . . stood in the mutually acknowledged relation of
parent ... or to or for the use of a lineal descendant." The testatrix

was not related to the legatees by either blood or marriage, but stood
in the mutually acknowledged relation of grandparent. The court felt
that this was not enough.
VI. CONCLUSIONS

It seems quite clear from all of the cases that the inheritance tax
laws will not operate to defeat vested rights. Thus, once having properly received his legacy or gift, the son-in-law is in no danger of losing
the gift or of having the -tax reimposed after his wife's death, his
divorce; or his remarriage.
Where, however, the son-in-law is a surviving spouse or a remarried
spouse at the time the transfer takes effect, the problem is not so easily
solved. It seems that the weight of authority favors the rule that a
surviving spouse is a "husband" within the meaning of the statute.
Not only do the majority of cases seem to support this view, but there
is an argument from silence in that no legislature appears to have disapproved of its judiciary's reasoning by amending the statute to disqualify such a surviving spouse. The amendments in at least three
states 44 have, in fact, gone the other way, the statutes now reading
"husband or widower."
Section 71.10(6) (b) (8) of the Wisconsin Income Tax Act, while
perhaps not pertinent on the remarriage issue, may be of some value
on the surviving spouse issue. That section, in defining dependents of
the taxpayer, states that "The relationship of affinity, once existing,
will not be terminated by divorce or death of a spouse." It may be that
the court would not regard this section as being in pari materia with
-the Inheritance Tax Law. Assuming the two are in pari materia, two
further problems are presented: first, the terminology of the Income
Tax Act is "son-in-law, daughter-in-law", and second, it may be that
the only spouse referred to is the spouse of the taxpayer (or in our
case the testator or donor).
On the question of the effect of remarriage, the authorities are
42 Supra, notes 17 and 25.
43 Supra, note 18. See, however, CCH Inh. Tax Rep., §18,976 in which the Texas

Attorney General (Opinion No. WW-629) held that adopted children of a
decedent's sister are to be included among "lineal issue" of the sister.
44 Illinois, New Jersey and New York See note 1.
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much more evenly divided. The answer given in a particular jurisdiction often depends on the court's viewpoint on three problems:
1. Are the words descriptive of the person or are they descriptive
of a state or condition?
2. Is the statute involved to be liberally construed in favor of the
taxpayer or strictly against him?
3. Is the statute involved taken from New York legislation and, if
so, did the local legislature impliedly adopt lower court New York
decisional law?
In Wisconsin there seems to be no case construing "wife, widow,
husband" as used in any statute, nor does there seem to be any close
analogy on the descriptio personae problem.45 There is Wisconsin
authority (in income tax cases) 4 6 favoring strict construction of exemptions against the taxpayer, but it will be remembered that the terms
involved are applicable to rates and to exclusions from taxable powers
of appointment as well as to exemptions, and it is probable that the
court would give a uniform construction to the words wherever appearing in the Inheritance Tax Act. Also, in a four to three decision
involving the inheritance tax,47 the Wisconsin Supreme Court has de*clared a rule of strict construction against the state of all ambigutities
involved in the act and has further stated that the act was taken from
New York and the decisional law of that state will govern in Wisconsin. Only New York appellate cases were cited, however. It will be
recalled that the Woolsey case 4s was decided in 1887 and the Ray
case 49 not until 1895, whereas Wisconsin first adopted the language in
question in an inheritance tax lawl in 1899.50 It might be argued that
the legislature should not be charged with knowledge of these cases so
soon after their publication. After the 1899 lav was declared unconstitutional,5 1 however, the legislature has many times readopted the
language in question. 52 Thus it may not be entirely unfair to charge
the legislature with knowledge of decisional law.
On policy grounds, it may be well argued that the legislative intent
45

A different but somewhat related problem is discussed by Professor Page.

When a gift is to the "wife ' of a named person who is married at the tine
of the will, the term is descriptio personae, and the woman married to the
named person at the time of the will takes the gift. If the person is unmarried
at the time the will is made, the gift goes to the woman who is married to
him at the testator's death. Page, Wills, §§1007 & 1008 (1941).
46 First Wisconsin Trust Co. v. Tax Commission, 238 Wis. 199, 298 N.W. 595
(1941); Bowman Dairy Co. v. Tax Commission, 240 Wis. 1, 1 N.W. 2d 887
(1942) ; Comet Co. v. Department of Taxation, 243 Wis. 117, 9 N.W. 2d 616
(1943).
47 Estate of Sweet, 270 Wis. 256, 70 N.W. 2d 605 (1954).
48 Supra, note 14.
49
Supra, note 15.
50
Laws 1899, ch. 355.
51 Black v. State, 113 Wis. 205, 89 N.W. 522 (1902).
52 See, e.g., Bullinger, Wisconsin Inheritance, Gift, Estate and Emergency Tax
Manual, 1949.
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was to benefit the son-in-law despite the wife's death and even his remarriage, since to do so would, in many cases, redound to the ultimate
benefit of the donor's grandchildren. It appears that immediate gifts
to grandchildren are favored in the tax laws, and there would seem to
be no reason that indirect benefits (although somewhat speculative)
should be treated differently. In the case of minor grandchildren, a
gift to the surviving parent would seem to be the normal way to avoid
the expenses and complications of a trust or guardianship or power of
appointment. On these grounds it is suggested that Wisconsin would
be wise to follow the more liberal rule.
Until the issue is resolved in Wisconsin, problems may arise not
only in the tax field but also under property law, unless the draftsman
is careful to avoid certain pitfalls. Thus it would seem to be advisable
in drafting a will to benefit a son-in-law regardless of changed circumstances for the instrument to refer to the beneficiary by name. The
reason is that, if a gift to "my daughter's husband" were to receive
unfavorable tax treatment (where the beneficiary is a widower or remarried), the same rationale might invalidate the gift altogether. In
drafting a power of appointment, however, a dilemma is presented. If
the statutory language is used, any valid appointment made under the
power should escape taxation, although the donee of the power may be
restricted to a class narrower than he wishes, and perhaps narrower
than the donor intended. If, on the other hand, persons within the
statutory exemption at the time of the creation of the power are specifically named by the draftsman, any of such persons will validly take
regardless of changed circumstances, and yet the transfer may be taxable even if exercised in favor of a presently qualified person or even
if left unexercised. Moreover, the tax authorities could be successful
(though it may be improbable) in a highly imaginative and speculative
contention that, regardless of the existing circumstances at the time of
the exercise or lapse of the power, the transfer is taxable since a
named possible appointee could have survived his spouse and perhaps
remarried. Until the court has given the final answer, it appears that
the draftsman may have to take his chances, lean toward breadth of
the class of possible appointees or toward a more restrictive class with
certain tax-saving, whichever the testator may intend.
DONALD MILLER

